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One of the paradoxes of common law adjudication concerns collective 
rights. On the one hand, jurists have sought to identify a collective 
right in terms of a legal source. The source functions as the 
referent or object of a justification. This rational justificatory act is 
thought to render a legal as opposed to a moral character to a 
collective right. On the other hand, in this effort to identify a justified 
collective right, the quest for its source proceeds in a linear 
direction. This justification excludes the cultural phenomena as 
elements of law. Form displaces substance. The cultural 
phenomena may be presupposed in the content of the collective right. 
But it is the relation of the bounded form of a collective right to the 
referent of justification that renders an identity to a collective right. The 
paradox is that when courts and scholars have sought to identify a 
collective right, the quest for the right's source has excluded the 
cultural phenomena generating the content of the collective right. The 
exclusionary character of a collective right signals the difference 
between law and other disciplines. So too, the exclusion of cultural 
phenomena triggers the difference between law and morals. The 
justification of a collective right takes for granted that rights take 
precedence over a culture. 
The paradox - the exclusion of the study of the very cultural 
phenomena generating the legal recognition of a collective right - is 
manifested in positive and negative contexts. In the positive contexts, 
affirmative preference has been institutionalized for persons said to 
be entitled to collective rights. Some countries offer such 
preference to refugees. Other states only grant citizenship to 
persons of certain ethnicities or sanguinis ('bloodline'). Affirmative 
preference has also been given to persons believed to be members 
of a linguistic or racial category. Such a preference has been 
manifested in the employment practices, admission to law, medical 
and dental schools, and admission to universities for example. In 
negative contexts, the boundary of a collective right excludes 


















treatment. 1 To take a recent example, nationals of the UK and USA are 
assured of constitutional rights. Both states (and there are no doubt 
many others), though, have recently legislated the exclusion of “alien" 
residents from legal protections otherwise guaranteed to non-aliens.2 
Common law analysis of collective rights has proceeded as if the 
justified form of collective rights can be identified and understood 
without examining the cultural phenomena presupposed inside the 
boundary of the collective right. Put more correctly, the examination of 
the cultural phenomena has come after the collective right has been 
identified. At that point, collective rights have then been applied to 
the cultural phenomena. The cultural phenomena themselves have 
been identified in terms of the familiar concepts and categories of 
jurists. This has been so despite the increasing interest in the cultural 
contexts in which collective rights are identified and elaborated.3 
Four ultimate referents in the justification of collective 
rights have been offered in common law jurisprudence: a basic text 
said to found the legal order, the regularity of behaviour of 
lawyers and judges, a rationally consistent narrative and some 
ultimate concept such as dignity. Unwritten customs, habits, 
assumptions and the like have only been assumed to be 'legal' if they 
could be justified in terms of one of the sources.4 Legal history has 
been understood as a discipline or area of study in terms of the 
sources rather than the social-cultural content of the justified 
rules/rights. Even the idea of a 'context' has been understood as a 
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jurist has usually taken the basic text as the referent of the act. In this 
act of justification, the focus upon the text has left the content of the 
collective right to the side. Even when one turns to Anglo-American 
theorists who elaborate an alternative to the isolation of cultural 
phenomena, a shadow-box with written sources has risked 
characterizing the alternative. 1 
My question is 'why?' Why have collective rights analytically 
trumped social-cultural phenomena even though the phenomena 
constitute the content of the rights? By justifying rights in terms of the 
three sources, jurists have claimed that they are describing the practice 
of law.2 One comprehensive study of cultural perspectives on law   has  
asserted,  for  example,  that  "no  substantial  body  of  work 
demonstrating the methodological commitments, theoretical premises, 
and political convictions that characterize the interdisciplinary field of 
cultural studies has yet appeared with respect to law."3 This has been 
so, it has been said, because legal pedagogues and other jurists have 
been seeped in a culture which rarely stands outside its own 
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Again, my question is why the justification of collective rights - 
indeed, of any rights - has been considered analytically prior and 
exclusive of cultural phenomena in adjudication. Why are cultural 
phenomena, put differently, not considered elements of a law? Ishall 
argue that such a priority has naively ignored the analytic importance 
of culture in identifying collective rights. In an effort to make this claim, 
Ishall highlight in Section 1 how a collective right has been considered 
radically different from a culture. Section 2 briefly explains how legal 
analysis has usually portrayed the exclusionary character of a 
collective right. I shall exemplify such a character with respect to 
peremptory norms in international law and affirmative discrimination in 
domestic constitutional law. Section 3 then explains the importance of 
understanding a collective right and a culture in terms of language. 
The language of a collective right is written. The language of a culture 
is unwritten. Section 4 proceeds to highlight the conditions making for 
the unwritten language of a culture. I shall conclude that a collective 
right exists by virtue of the analytically unwritten character of a 
culture's unwritten language. 
The Presupposed Disjuncture between Collective Rights and a 
Culture 
We tend to think our job finished as a lawyer, judge,  law  professor    or 
law student if we have identified a right. Once a right is identified, state 
institutions are believed to possess a duty to protect the individual or 
group possessing the right. A right, though, is a concept. It is the 
product of an act of intellectualisation. The right is believed to exist 'out 
there' in a metaphysical world separate from the bodily experiences of 
the individual or group. In the quest for the identity of a right, such a 
metaphysical world displaces the shared experiential world constituting 
a culture. We gain an experiential knowledge. Such an experiential 
knowledge is constituted from assumptions and expectations shared 
by members of the group possessing the collective right. But in our 
preoccupation with justifying a concept/rule with reference to some 
ultimate source, we exclude the experiential knowledge from what we 
take as 'legal'. 
A collective right, such as signified in Sections 15(1), 19 and 35 of 
Canada's Constitution Act, 1867 for example, may be recognised in a 
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the basic text, a social group is identified and defined.This group may 
well not be the same in-group culturally or politically dominant in a 
society. It is the legally recognized in-group that I have in mind. The 
point is that some inhabitants may lack a sharing or social-cultural 
bonding with the affirmed group. For example, a group's identity may 
be generated from such cultural factors as the religious practices of its 
members. And yet, an individual member may not share the practices. 
Similarly, the legally affirmed group may be identified because of the 
historical disadvantage of the members of the group generating the 
social-cultural content of the affirmed group. The group members' 
ancestors, for example, may have been enslaved or the object of racial 
or ethnic discrimination. And yet, an individual member of the group 
may lack such a disadvantage. Or her/his ancestors may not have in 
fact experienced ethnic or racial discrimination. The criterion of 
historical disadvantage, for example, may be economic. And yet, the 
individual member of the racial or ethnic category may be economically 
well-off or her/his ancestors may have been well-off. Why does the 
quest for an identifiable collective right leave social-cultural 
phenomena to the side until the right ls analytically identified and 
applied to the phenomena? The problem is that a collective right begs 
an enquiry into the nature of legal obligation rather than the quest for 
the identity of a collective right. 
Now, a culture  differs  from  such  a structure  of  collective   rights. 
How so? Collective rights, I noted above, are concepts. A culture's 
identity, in turn, is constituted from assumptions and expectations 
shared by members of a social group. Such assumptions and 
expectations are unwritten. The assumptions and expectations are 
taken for granted.The assumptions and expectations constitute what I 
have called experiential knowledge. Such assumptions and 
expectations are not the objects of reflection, deliberation or inscription 
as are collective rights as concepts. We only know the identity of a 
collective right, we have been led to believe, because it is a concept 
and, more, a concept justified in terms of some ultimate referent such 
as a basic text. Such an act of intellectualization takes a direction very 
different from the genealogy of the social-cultural phenomena 
presupposed in the content of the collective right or its justified source. 














Let us delve alittle deeper into the identity of a collective right. The 
usual justification of a collective right is authoritative by justifying the 
right in terms of the text and by doing so arguing in a very different 
direction than would a cultural study. This linear direction to some text 
even trumps the very social-cultural phenomena generating why this 
group, rather than that group, is entitled to the right. A right is a 
concept as opposed to experiential knowledge. A basic text signifies 
right as concepts. 
The role of concepts plays out in a context where a text is 
presumed to represent rights (that is concepts) 'out there' separate 
from the jurist. In the second, by justifying one's starting-point in terms 
of the text, what starts as a subjectivity is analytically transformed into 
a structure of concepts in a legal objectivity. This transformation even 
characterizes the claim that the justificatory act begins with a value - 
better understood as an intuition, as Ishall address in another effort.1 
The justificati on is directed towards concepts. The justified referents 
are a priori concepts. An a priori concept is prior to phenomena, 
including the phenomena constituting a culture. The rights, as 
concepts, intellectually supersede the experiential world. And so, we 
can claim to 'know' the original intent of the framers of a basic text 
from an external standpoint. What might be taken as subjective is 
transformed into a concept situated in a legal objectivity. Once 
recognized as a concept, the basic text becomes the referent for the 
validity of any justified right or rule. Our analytic methodology, so 
institutionalized in Anglo-American legal thought, seems to reinforce 
the analytic priority of concepts over a context-specific, experienced 
event.
2 
The concept is general in that it is content-independent. An 
experienced event comes into play after the right is identified as a legal 
concept and after the identifiable right is then applied to a context- 
specific experience. The big question is whether  content-independent 
concepts can displace the embodiment of the content of the concepts 
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displacement, Iwish to exemplify how the identity of a collective right is 
content-independent in two contexts: peremptory international norms 
and affirmative discrimination in constitutional legal discourse. 
Conflict with Peremptory Norms 
In the context of a peremptory norm, the identity of a collective 
right concerns a norm recognised in public international legal 
discourse. By Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which most states on the globe have ratified, a peremptory 
norm is uaccepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole from which no derogation is permitted" and, 
secondly, the norm may be umodified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character."
1 
By Article 64 of 
the   Vienna  Convention,   any   emerging  'new   peremptory   norm of 
general international law' renders any conflicting treaty norm uvoid". 
It remains unclear, however, what norms are peremptory or 
why they are peremptory.2 The International Court stated in Barcelona, 
for example, that peremptory norms include "the basic rights of the 
human person, including protection from ... racial discrimination."
3 
Other  cultural factors,  such as discrimination  of the  grounds    of 
ethnicity, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
descent, and property, have been considered proscribed by 
peremptory norms.4 Non-refoulement has been proscribed as a 
peremptory   norm  as  well.5    If   the  content  of  a  treaty  provision  is 
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Community" in European J lnt'J L 23 (2012), 837-61: "The Peremptory Norms of the 
lnternalfonal Community: A Rejoinder to Alexander Orakhelashvilli" in European J lnt1 L. 
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Journal of Refugee Law (2001) 533, at 533-58; Lilf Linderfalk, "The Effect of Jus Cogens 
Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora's Box, Did you Ever Think About the Consequences?" in 18 















conditioned by such proscribed culturally constructed categories, the 
categories are considered legally invalid. No state may derogate from  
a peremptory norm proscribing cultural factors as one's national origin 
or  ancestral  descent.
1    
Peremptory  norms  have  been  extended  to 
invalidate customary international norms and general principles of 
international law as well as treaty provisions.2 
Although a collective right may be legislated or recognised by 
the judiciary of a state, a peremptory norm exists by virtue of a culture. 
There is something about a peremptory norm which addresses why an 
international community - itself a collectivity - exists. Unless one 
examines the cultural phenomena generating a peremptory norm, the 
norm exists as if in the air. It is reified from the social-cultural existence 
conditions for the very possibility of an international community. 3 
The dependence of the identity of a peremptory norm upon the 
culture of an international community may be extended further. A 
community protected by a collective right possesses a culturally 
constructed boundary. That boundary defines 'who are the 
community's members?'. The boundary also excludes non-members 
from entitlement to the collective rights attached to the community. The 
'community' and its rights may be considered universal in terms of the 
boundary of the community. This line of argument also extends to a 
group affirmatively protected by a basic constitutional text. The 
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the community as defined by the collective rights. The boundary 
demarcates the group worthy of protection by a collective right. Such a 
view takes for granted that, once the right is justified in terms of a 
concept, a collective right is analytically content-independent of the in- 
group's culture and the cultures of the excluded groups. The members 
of the community may well be considered equal before the law, for 
example. So, for example, members of the out-groups may be 
categorised as aliens or foreigners or 'not us'. The boundary of a 
collective right, as an a priori concept, may well possess an 
exclusioary as well as a universal character. A collective right, again, 
is a concept. Rules, principles, doctrines and legal tests are other 
concepts. The exclusionary character triggered by the boundary of a 
right/concept - as with the boundary of an international community or 
of a constitutionally protected social group - impacts upon the cultures 
of the community or intra-state group as well as the cultures of the 
excluded communities or groups. 
A culture is a radically different phenomenon than is a concept. A 
culture is embodied with shared assumptions and expectations 
experienced by individual human beings and/or as a people as a 
whole. A culture generates, that is, from the experiential knowledge of 
members of a group rather than from a jurist's knowledge about 
concepts. A culture, I shall note in a moment, lacks an author. A 
parliament, for example, does not and cannot author a culture. Without 
examining how context-specific experiential knowledge generates the 
content of a concept, the content is presupposed or posited. Our 
starting-point is a basic text. Without examining such experiential 
knowledge, the exclusionary character of a community's boundary is 
posited as a 'given'. The boundary exists in a metaphysical world of 
concepts. And yet, with the force of the state behind the community's 
priority over other cultural groups, the boundary is enforced against 
those excluded from membership of the in-group. Any belief is na'ive to 
the extent that it takes for granted that the collective rights a group 
represent social reality. Much like a unicorn or a half-human creature 
for which we may observe its 'existence' in a painting or sculpture, a 
collective right exists in a metaphysical world unless we can link the 
social-cultural content of the right to the social culture from which it is 
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character of peremptory norms just as it does of other collective rights. 
Peremptory norms end up dwelling in the air unless one examines the 
cultural factors making for the boundary of each norm as well as the 
excluded collectivities protected by the boundary. 
Affirmative Discrimination 
In the second context, the seeming analytic priority of a 
collective right over culture, also dissolves in favour of cultural 
phenomena. I have in mind here, 'affirmative discrimination'. At first 
sight, discrimination is considered morally and legally invalid if the 
discrimination exists on the basis of ethnicity, language, religion, race 
or other criteria set out in the non-discrimination clauses of human 
rights treaties. But governments not infrequently take it upon 
themselves    to    constitutionally    and    legislatively    discriminate 
affirmatively in favour of the members of a particular group believed to 
be in need of legal protection.Issues need to be addressed. 1 
To take an example, one justification for an affirmative 
discrimination program may rest upon the perception that members or 
ancestors of the group actually possessed the territory before the state 
claimed title to the territory. Another justification might be that 
members of the affirmed group have been historically disadvantaged 
by the state institutions. A further justification may concern that 
members of the affirmed group were harmed in the past by private 
social and economic organizations independent of the state. Once 
identified as a group worthy of affirmative action, individuals and other 
groups may be excluded from the affirmative discrimination. 
To take Canada as an example and only as an example, collective 
rights have been inscribed in basic constitutional and quasi- 
constitutional texts of the state. 
i) Affirmative discrimination programs 
Affirmative discrimination is expressly entertained by Section 
15(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, for 
example. Section 15(1) guarantees an individual's "equality before and 
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Section 15(1) also guarantees that no law will discriminate on the basis 
of "race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability". Section 15(2) then entertains the prospect of future 
affirmative discriminatory programs aimed to benefit members of 
particular socially distinct groups. According to Section 15(2), the 
legislative intent of the program must have as its object "the 
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups 
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.n 
This discriminatory intent may be considered constitutionally valid. This 
may be so despite the text's guarantees of equality before and under 
the law, equal protection and equal benefit of the law, and such 
equality "without discrimination ..." inscribed in Article 15(1). The 
question which I am posing presses the legal issue further than the 
wording of a basic text: 'are the collective rights of the affirmatively 
discriminated group analytically prior to the cultural content of the 
collective rights presupposing the identity of such an affirmed group?' 
For that matter, are collective rights of the affirmed group analytically 
prior to the  cultural identity  of  excluded  groups?  Both  Canadian and 
American courts have encountered this issue.
1
 
ii) aboriginal rights 
To take another example of the issue, the dependence of 
collective rights to cultural phenomena is also exemplified if one turns 
to Section 35(1) of the Canada Act, 1982. Section 35(1) provides that 
"[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed." But who is a member of 
"the aboriginal peoples of Canada" without examining the anthropology 
of the diverse cultures of Canada? Section 35(2) states that "aboriginal 
peoplesn include "the Indian, Inuit and Me is peoples of Canada". But 
does that help the jurist without examining the prior cultural 
phenomena generating such "peoples"? A substantial number of 
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not on reservations. Once again, we are left with the question, what is 
the criterion of identifying the collective right of the identifiable group if 
the territorial locus of the group is indeterminate? How can the 
members be identified without examining the extent to which the 
members have been culturally assimilated into or excluded from the 
legal in-group(s)? What are the criteria of cultural assimilation - 
language? religious practices? the extent of culture-specific education 
to members? the extent to which a group is culturally excluded from 
state-centric education programs? And on it goes. Is membership 
based upon those born on a particular territorial reservation or those 
whose parents had once inhabited a reservation in the past? Must both 
parents have been considered aboriginal persons? Is it left to the 
individual to say s/he is 'aboriginal'? How far back in history must we 
turn in order to be confident that one is an aboriginal person? 
If we must turn backward into the history of a society in order to 
ascertain whether members of a group were disadvantaged, do we 
turn to a time prior to the founding of a state by a basic text? For that 
matter, which text represents the beginning of the Canadian legal 
order: 1763 (the Royal Proclamation), 1841 (the Constitution Act), 
1867 (the British North America Act, UK), 1931 (the Statute of 
Westminster, UK), 1980 (the Constitution Act including the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms) or any other number of dates when various 
Provinces were added to the legal order and territory of the state? 
Each date represents a different source of justification of a collective 
right. Does the backward-looking examination of a rule's justification in 
terms of some basic text incorporate nomadic groups who may have 
been indigenous to the territory now claimed by the state of Canada? 
Unable to resolve such issues, do jurists leave it to each inhabitant or 
group to declare whether s/he/it shares the culture of the affirmatively 
discriminated group? 
iii) linguistic and religious affirmative discrimination 
To take another example of the dissolution of a collective right 
into cultural issues, Section 16(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 
1867 recognizes English and French as the Official Languages of 
Canada. The two languages are guaranteed as having equal legal 
status, rights and privileges in all institutions of Parliament and of the 







- 127 - 
 ...........,,,., Cultural   Rights 
this collective right to a province, New Brunswick. Article 16(3) 
reserves the legal authority of any province "to advance the equality of 
status or use of English or French." Article 133 of the Constitution Act, 
1867 guarantees the use of either English or French in national and 
provincial legislative proceedings. Except for the province of Quebec 
(according to Article 93A of the Constitution Act), Article 93 of the Act 
protects denominational schools, "separate schools" of "Roman 
Catholic subjects", and "Dissentient schools" of Protestant and Roman 
Catholic subjects. 
The    necessary    incorporation    of    cultural    issues   into 
constitutional reasoning is apparent. Can one understand why other 
groups are excluded from affirmative discrimination without addressing 
their social history and social identity? How can a French-speaking or 
Roman religious group be justified as deserving of affirmative 
discrimination without giving more weight to the social and political 
history of the groups to, say, the social history of the larger numbers of 
non-French and non-Roman churchgoers today? And why does the 
past trump the present? Why may the French-speaking or Roman 
religious group be discriminated affirmatively, say, in education even 
though funding is from the state and other groups' funding is lacking 
from the state. What are "separate schools" of "Roman Catholic 
subjects" when the funding of the schools is substantially from the 
state. What is a "dissentient school" without examining the context- 
specific cultural phenomena concerning religious clashes  at  present 
and in the past? The basic text lacks meaning without the prior study  
of cultural phenomena. 
ii) the problematic of the content-independence of collective 
rights in affirmative discrimination 
Now, when one studies how the higher courts of Canada have 
addressed the above collective rights, the analysis of the collective 
rights proceeds as if the content of the collective right exists 
independent of the cultural context impacting both included and 
excluded groups. Put differently, a legal formalism has characterised 
the identity of a collective right and its applicability in any so-called set of 
facts. Canadian courts have been quick to exclude the incorporation of 
cultural phenomena as possessing "insufficient legal content", "theory", 















policy", matters of a "purely political in nature", "disconnected from 
reality", insufficiently "ripe" to be considered law, "inappropriate to 
answer", "subjectivity", and "outside its [the judiciary's] area of 
expertise".1 As the Canadian Supreme Court explained in the 
Secession Reference (1998) "if the Court is of the opinion that it is 
being asked a question with a significant extra-legal component, it may 
interpret the question so as to answer only its legal aspects; if this is 
not possible, the Court may decline to answer the question."2 The 
Secession Reference, a unanimous landmark judgement outlining 
whether and when a province may secede from Canada, has been 
affirmatively quoted in legal judgments of other states.According to the 
Secession Court, all constitutional rules are said to exist if justifiabl e in 
terms of "sources" independent of the content of the rules.3 
Consistent with such a point of view, published teaching 
materials for students of Canadian law have justified the exclusion of 
studies and evidence of a culture as 'political' or 'extra-legal'.4 One 
treatise, Constitutional Law of Canada for example, begins with a 
"definition" of constitutional law as if constitutional rights existed 'out 
there' in a metaphysical objectivity distinct from any particular culture 
which may have generated the rights.5 Other treatises have followed 
suit.
6 




See esp. Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 SCR 791 at paras. 85-89 per 
Deschamps & para. 183 per Binnie & Lebel dissenting; Ref re Same-sex Marriage, [ 2004] 3 
SCR 698 at paras. 10, 62,64 (unanimous); Ref re Secession of Quebec (1998) 2 SCR  217, 
161 DLR (4
1 
) 385 at paras. 25-30;Ref re Canada Assistance Plan (BC), [1991) 2 SCR 525 at 
545. 
2  
Ref re Secession of Quebec [1998) 2 SCR 217; 161 DLR (4111  385 at para. 28. 
3 
Hogg, Constitutional Law supra note 4, at 1-1 to 1-31.Also see his 1-1 to 1-2; Constitutional 
Law of Canada 2012 Student ed. (Toronto:Carswell,2012), 1-1 to 1-31. 
' See Leonard Rotman, Bruce Elman, & Gerald Gall eds., Constitutional Law: Cases, 
Commentary and Principles (Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2008). esp. at 109-111; Magnet, 
Constitutional Law of Canada fl' ed. (Edmonton: Juriliber, 2007), vol. 1 at 1; Constitutional 
Law Group, Canadian Constitutional Law 4th edn (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2010). 
5 
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada supra note 4, at 1-1 to 1-2;Student ed. supra note 24, at 1- 
1 to1-2. 
0 
Bernard W. Funston and Eugene Meehan, Canada's Constitutional Law in a Nutshell 3"' ed. 
(Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2003), at 15-16. Also see Patrick J. Monahan, Constitutional 
Law 3"' ed. (Toronto:Irwin Law,2006),4-10.In his Politics and the Constitution.: The Charier, 
Federalism and the Supreme Courl of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), 83-4 where 
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been considered judicially enforceable.1 Unwritten habits and rituals 
have been considered extra-law and therefore not laws, at least until 
relatively recently. 
The Content-independence of Collective Rights Exemplified 
The prior analytic   issues concerning  cultural  phenomena are 
exemplified in the relatively recent Canadian Supreme Court judgment 
of Lovelace (2000).2 The background to the Lovelace case was as 
follows. Members of a particular "bandn of indigenous inhabitants were 
the object of affirmative discrimination. By a 'band', a left-over of the 
colonial heritage, the state has legislatively defined and superimposed 
the concept of "bandn upon the social events of indigenous peoples. 
The boundary of the affirmatively discriminated group excluded other 
groups, especially aboriginal members of any indigenous groups which 
had not been registered as a "bandn. A non-band group would exist, for 
example, if its members or leadership refused to be categorised as 
"Indians" under national legislation. Some groups refused to be 
registered as 'lndiansn because registration might undermine legal 
claims arising from treaties signed and ratified by the colonial state a 
century or so earlier. 
Now,  Lovelace  exemplifies  an occasion when  courts  had to 
address the affirmative discrimination by a provincial government. The 
cause of the discrimination was the construction of a casino in a 
territory inhabited by the band. The state conferred legal authority to 
the band to establish a casino and to employ only members of "the 
band", Ms Lovelace claimed that such an affirmative discrimination 
would cause harm to herself and to other members of non-band 
groups. The harms, interestingly, concerned cultural harms: the 
vulnerability of her group to cultural assimilation, the absence of rules 
from an independent source of livelihood, a compromised capacity for 
her group to protect its traditional homelands, a lack of access of her 
members to culturally-specific health, educational and social service 
 
 
1 As Hogg puts it, "because they [unwritten conventions] are not enforced by the law courts, they 
are best regarded as non-legal rules, but because they do In fact regulate the working of the 
constitution, they are an important concern of the constitutional lawyer Hogg, Constitutional 
Law supra note 4, 1-22.1. 













programs, and a chronic pattern of her group being ignored by both the 
national and provincial governments. Now, the Court admitted that it 
should examine the "substantive", rather than the  "formalistic", 
language of collective rights. The Msubstantive" language would 
suggest an examination of the cultural content of the rights. When 
pressed to identify why the boundary of band Indians could exclude all 
other aboriginal inhabitants, however, the Court turned to the 
abstraction, "the perspective of the reasonable individual". This 
standpoint, infused as it is with the colonial legal culture of  the  UK, 
marks the superimposition of such a legal culture onto the indigenous 
traditions   of   both  the   affirmatively   discriminated  in-group   and the 
excluded out-groups. 1 Put differently, a legal concept, 'the reasonable 
man', is superimposed upon the cultures although the legal concept 
itself is peculiar to a particular culture, the legal culture of the colonial 
authority. On the surface, the 'collective right' of the state is 
superimposed upon buried cultural phenomena. The Canadian 
Supreme Court concluded that the claim of Lovelace for recognition of 
her band's collective rights could not be justified in terms of some 
basic text.
2 
Indeed, the Court concluded that the cultural contexts 
effectively constituted affirmative action. Under the authority of Section 
15(2) of the Charter, just noted, the complainant's 'band' dissolved in 
favour of the group conferred affirmative discrimination.3 But the 
judgment is remarkable for the absence of context-specific 
anthropological evidence concerning either the affirmed or excluded 
groups. No social history, no study of the cultural harm caused by 
favour the one group over the other, no context-specific empirical 
evidence concerning employ6ment levels of members of either group, 
and on it goes. Legal formalism trumped the social-cultural 
phenomena presupposed in the content of the in- and out-groups. The 
collective rights institutionalised in the above affirmative discrimination 




1 Lovefsce v Ontario, [2000] 1 SCR 950 (SCC), para 90. 
2 Lovelace v Ontario, [2000] 1 SCR 950 (SCC), para 89. 
3 
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was analytically and factually prior to the cultures of the included and 
excluded groups. 
The dissolution of the analysis of collective rights into cultural 
studies 
One approach to a collective right entitling an individual to 
affirmative discrimination is to ask whether members of the 
discriminated group or their ancestors were in fact the object of actual 
social-cultural discrimination by the state. That question, in turn, asks 
whether the affirmative discrimination in favour of a particular group 
can be resolved without first understanding the social-cultural 
conditions constituting the group's distinct culture vis-a-vis the distinct 
cultures of the out-groups. 
As an example, affirmative discrimination raises the issue, 
'what is the criterion of the identity of the historically previous out-group 
to be rendered the object of contemporary affirmative discrimination?' 
If a collective right is attributed to a group and if discrimination is based 
upon the historical disadvantage of the group, is there discrimination if 
some members of the group have not in fact been disadvantaged? 
Can that issue be resolved without addressing the role of economics in 
the culture of the discriminated group? If the culture is that of a 
traditional group (or 'people' or 'society') for example, is the culture or 
has the culture been characterised by a sharing of property? Is it just 
that a criterion of the identity and boundary of a social group is the 
market economy or is it a more traditional exchange economy? After 
all, the criterion of past discrimination may exist by virtue of how a 
colonial state assimilated members of the group or destroyed the 
exchange economy prior to the founding text of the state.A state, one 
needs reminding, possesses radical title to the territory. Such a title 
justifies the state's claimto authority over all objects on the territory. 
If economic criteria did not or have not characterised the 
culture of the affirmatively discriminated group, is the criterion of 
'historical disadvantage' that of, say, massive atrocities against 
members of the affirmatively discriminated group? If not physical harm 
such as the massive atrocity of ancestors of the group, then is the 
group itself the object of a cultural violence by the present laws or 
officials? If the harm was not caused by a state, is affirmative 













groups? Was the state legally obligated to protect members of the 
discriminated group? 
More, what length of time of being disadvantaged must one 
incorporate into a contemporary claim for affirmative action? One 
generation? Two generations? Three generations? Or may we 
consider the economic, physical or cultural violence of centuries ago? 
As such harm recedes into the past, is it not more difficult to claim an 
injustice against present individual members of a social group? How 
can we be certain, for example, that an existing member of the social 
group has been economically, physically or culturally harmed because 
of such collective harm to her/his ancestors? Even if we were certain 
that ancestors of present members of a group were economically, 
physically or culturally disadvantaged, the category of membership in 
the discriminated group may be both over-inclusive and under- 
inclusive. So, for example, if we take economic, physical or cultural 
harm as the criterion and if we affirmatively discriminate in favour of 
first- (or second-) generation refugees to one's state, some refugees, 
compared to other refugee members in the refugee group, may be 
very economically well-off or have lacked physical or cultural harm. 
Conversely, the boundary of the discriminated category may be under- 
inclusive because non-refugee members may also be the object of 
economic, physical or cultural harm. The boundary of the categorised 
social group does not fit with the suffering that needs to be 
compensated or with any criterion of distributive justice. 
To complicate matters, if cultural phenomena of, say, ethnicity 
or religion or race are considered the basis of affirmative action, how 
does a jurist determine whether an individual is a member of such a 
group? Is a shared language the key? If so, does an individual of the 
discriminated group remain deserving of a collective right if s/he has 
assimilated the official language of a state? If not language, then is a 
shared religion the basis of being protected by a collective right? And 
which sect of an institutional religion? What religion or religious sect 
exists without theological differences or interpretations of the shared 
basic texts? If not language or religion, do the cultural phenomena of 
ethnicity satisfy the very possibility of a collective right? But what 
distinguishes an ethnicity? Does an ethnicity exist by virtue of a shared 















territory? Again, how long ago need one's family have originated on 
such a territory? 
The   cultural   context   of   a   collective   right  is    still more 
complicated. This is so because the boundary of the social out-group 
now entitled to affirmative discrimination excludes other groups whose 
cultural identities from that of the out-group now entitled to affirmative 
discrimination. The exclusionary character of reverse discrimination is 
all the more complicated when one appreciates that the criterion of 
membership in the affirmed group may well, say, be economic but the 
criterion of the excluded groups may well be non-economic criteria. 
Indeed, the excluded groups may be characterized by physical 
violence by the state in the one group's ancestors and by cultural 
violence by the state with another group's ancestors. In sum, the 
affirmative discrimination in favour of any social group requires an 
examination of the cultural identity of excluded groups. The analytic 
priority of concepts - that is, of collective rights - over culture is 
suspect just as it was with peremptory norms. 
The point is that when push comes to shove, the quest for the 
identity of a collective right by reference to a basic constitutional text 
dissolves into the deeper issue pertaining to the obligatory character of 
the identifiable right. The obligatory character of a right, in tum, begs 
an enquiry into the nature and boundary of the dominant, 
supplementary and excluded cultures in a state-controlled territory. 
And how can these issues be resolved without examining the cultures 
of the in- and out-groups of affirmative discrimination? Something 
more is needed in order to understand, clarify and elaborate the 
identity of those groups entitled to collective rights. Something more is 
needed in order to determine the identity of the excluded groups as 
well as the alternative ways to institutionalize a collective right in a 
particular society. Such a quest for the identity of a collective right 
requires a study of the cultures composing a larger society, the social 
factors generating each culture, and the role of the state in recognising 
and institutionalising the protection of the members of the diverse 
culture(s). The starting-point of such issues addresses the boundary of 
legal knowledge which has heretofore separated collective rights from 
cultural phenomena. 













It may now be apparent that the language of a collective right radically 
differs from the language of a culture. A collective right, justified by a 
textual source, is signified by a written language. By a written 
language, the objects of the language are authored. Such objects are 
the product of reflection and deliberation. Officials of a state institution 
self-consciously reflect and deliberate about a right, as a concept, 
before they represent the right as a configuration of written signs. The 
author may be an historical agent, such as a legislature, or a 
constructed agent, such as 'the original intent of the founding fathers'. 
The writing represents or signifies a rule, principle, or doctrine, each of 
which is a cognitive object. 
A culture, in contrast, is constituted from acts of meaning drawn 
from the interpreter's experiential knowledge. Such acts of meaning 
embody (that is, give experiential body) to an interpretation of a text's 
signs. Acts of meaning are not found in some dictionary or statute or 
treaty even though, in English, one might use the term 'meaning' as if it 
can be found in a dictionary. A meaning is internal to one's 
consciousness. One draws from memories and expectations which 
s/he has experienced through time and space. Such acts of meaning 
lack a mediating text. A statute, treaty, court's judgment, or opinio juris 
exemplifies such a mediating text. A mediating text intercedes between 
an interpreter and the collective right. And so, if a collective right 
recognizes a social group, an individual falls either inside or outside 
the boundary of the affirmed group. The excluded individual may well 
be a stranger to the identity of the affirmed group. 
An incident of the written language is that time and space are 
measureable. Legal time begins, for example, with texts of a written 
language. Collective rights are assumed to exist once inscribed in the 
basic text or some interpretive act towards that text. The birthday of  
the basic text is even celebrated (the 'birthdate' of Canada is ironically 
celebrated on a different day from the signing of the foundational text). 
The existence of any culture prior to "the critical daten of the basic text 
is excluded as "pre-legaln or "politicain. So, for example, treaties 
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have until recently been considered unenforceable.1 Why? Because 
indigenous societies have been considered  lacking state-like 
institutions at the time of the signing of the treaties. Even legal history 
has been considered a history of concepts, not of cultures, and then 
only after the calendar birth-date of the state's legal order. With such a 
calendar time, the structure of concepts, of which collective rights are 
now units, becomes reified from the experiential knowledge shared by 
members of a culture. 
In the same way  that time  has been quantified  in  terms  of  a 
year, month, day and even hour rather than a time experienced by 
insiders and outsiders of collective rights, space too has been 
presumed to be quantifiable. In this context, space has had a territorial 
character. It is not just that the state and the state's domain reserve 
has been defined in terms of a territorial border. Even a right has a 
territorial-like space inside the boundary of the right. The right to 
property, whether private or public, has connoted a similar territorial- 
like space. Similarly, a social group has been considered 'free' if it 
possessed a territorial-like space as opposed to extra-legal 
phenomena external to the boundary of the legal space. Property also 
has a humanly constructed boundary within which one has what Kant 
called "intelligible possession".2 In like vein, a collective right is 
constructed by an act of intellectualizati on as if the boundary of the 
collective right protects a territorial-like space owned by a 'people' or 
'social or ethnic group'. 
A culture, in contrast, draws from a sense of space 
experienced by individuals. The boundary of such an experienced 





• Guerin v The Queen, (19841 SCR 335; 13 DLR (4
111
) 321. One Canadian Supreme Court judge 
has described Article 19(2) collective rights, noted above, as "political compromise rights" 
with the consequence that they are not "seminal" or "rooted in principle" as are "legal rights" 
(such as due process, right to council, and the like). Societe des Acadiens du Nouveau- 
Brunswick Inc. v Association of Parents for Fairness in Education [1986] 1 SCR 460; 27b 
DLR (41h) 406 (SCC). 
2   Immanuel  Kant, Metaphysical  Elements  of Justice, John  Ladd (trans), 2"" ed (Indianapolis: 
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through which one reads texts. 1 One is bonded to a culture by virtue of 
experiential time and space. Experiential time and space constitute 
objectivity, an objectivity that is meant rather than a measurable 
abstraction. The meant objectivity is peculiar to those bonded to a 
culture. 
By way of example, Sophocles' Antigone raised the prospect of 
an experiential knowledge of time and space. The king had called his 
counciltogether as a legal process. His council 'enacted' an edict that 
no one should bury the deceased body of Polyneices. The king's 
proscription against burying the corpse of Polyneices was a cognitive 
object -that is, a concept. The edict was publicly known by citizens, by 
the chorus, and by lsmene and Antigone. All citizens of Thebes were 
excluded from burying the body of Polyneices. Although no doubt 
lacking inscription in a text as one associates with a law today, the 
king's edict was the consequence of thought and deliberation before 
the council.The edict was 'written' in that it was authored.The polis of 
Thebes authored the edict. The authored edict manifested reflection 
and deliberation on the part of officials of the polis about the possible 
crime and the sentence of stoning to death. 
Such a 'written' law contrasted with the unwritten laws of 
Antigone's culture. When charged with having violated the edict, 
Antigone responded through a filter of experiential or unwritten 
knowledge.Such experiential knowledge drew from the experiences of 
her mother having married her brother, her loss of her two brothers on 
the same day, her sister aligning with the men, and, more generally, 
her having experienced right and wrong from the unwritten traditions of 
her clan or extended family. Such experiential knowledge constituted 
the culture of a clan with which she identified. The language of her 
culture, in contrast with the language of the king, was unwritten. As 
Antigone exclaimed when charged with violating the collective rights of 
the one social group (the city), her laws were uunwritten laws". The 




The effort to contrast measureable time and physical space with experiential lime and space is 
extended to legal analysis in my "A Phenomenological Theory of the Human Rights of the Alien" in 
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were "buriedn in a written language about legal obligation, as one 




That is, two senses of a law were at issue. The one was the 
King's edict proscribing the burying of the body of Polyneices with a 
sentence of stoning to death. The second involved unwritten 
conventions lacking the quantifiable time and space when and where 
the King had authored his edict. This second sense of a law had been 
experienced by members of Antigone's clan. The crucial issue for her 
laws concerned a legal obligation drawn from an experiential time and 
space. As Antigone exclaimed, These laws weren't made now Or 
yesterday. They live for all time, And no one knows when they came 
into the light.2 
 
One scholar translates the culture to which Antigone appeals as "the 
great unwritten, unshakable traditions".3 And another translates laws of 
her culture as "unwritten and unfailing".4 Antigone felt bonded with the 
unwritten language of her clan's culture. In contrast with the  King's 
edict, her laws lacked a discrete and assignable author. She had not 
self-consciously reflected nor deliberated with others about their 
unwritten language. She had felt obligated, as required of the eldest 
surviving member of the clan, to venture  out to the  battlefield and   to 
bury the body of her brother. Like the king, she felt that she had no 
choice in the matter. She just had to follow the unwritten law despite 
the protestations of her little sister and despite the consequences of 
contravening the King's edict. 
Against the contrast between a written and unwritten legal 
language, one would be remiss if one took for granted that only some 
intermediate social group, such as a clan, family, organisation or ethnic 
 
 
1 This may be what HLA Hart meant when he wrote that a "bond" was "buried" In the term "legal 
obligation". Hart, Concept of Law 3n1 edn (Oxford: Clarendon, 2013), 87. 
2 Antigone (trans by Paul Woodruff; Indianapolis: Hackel,2001), line 450-58. 
3 Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays (trans by Robert Fagles; New York: Penguin, 1982), line 
505. 
• Sophocles I(ed by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore; trans by Elizabeth Wyckoff; Chicago: 
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group, possessed collective rights. For today, a state itself possesses 
collective rights vis-a-vis other states and an international community  
as a whole. The state, as with any entity with collective rights, has an 
identifiable beginning by virtue of a basic text. The legal 'existence' of 
such a state, though, begins and ends with self-consciously authored 
writing. 
In contrast, the unwritten language of Antigone's culture constituted 
what others have called 'pre-legality'. Antigone's unwritten laws existed 
before the law as we have understood the sign 'law' - that is, law as 
statutes, treaties, precedents, international customary norms and 
opinia juris. We jurists are trained to exclude such cultural conditions 
as matters for anthropology or philosophy, not for law. As HLA Hart 
insisted, "[nJo doubt as a matter of history this step from the pre-legal 
to the legal may be accomplished in distinguishable stages, of which 
the first is the mere reduction to writing of hitherto unwritten rules."1 
Again, writing signifies (that is, re-presents) concepts. The writing is 
authored. 
But because collective rights are cognitive objects identified in a 
structure of cognitive objects, the boundary between law and culture is 
cognitively constructed. We construct a boundary between the 
collective rights, as cognitive objects, from the unknown and 
unknowable pre-legality. This boundary is ours, that of us legal 
knowers (of concepts). We posited the boundary between law and 
extra-legal. By positing such a boundary, we claim to know what is 
extra-legal. How else could we differentiate law from extra-law? And 
yet, because we insist that legal knowledge only incorporates concepts 
as opposed to the extra-legality of experiential knowledge (of an 
unwritten legal language), we exclude from 'law' an enquiry about the 
cultural conditions. Legality depends upon what is excluded from 
legality although we are excluded from knowing the excluded cultural 
phenomena. The excluded cultural conditions experientially and 
analytically precede the collective rights of legality. This is so even 
though we exclude the cultural conditions as 'relevant' to law. The 
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understood a legal language as necessarily authored. Only a written 
language can represent the rights of a social group. Rights themselves 
are concepts represented by basic texts. 
In contrast with the unwritten cultural phenomena, a collective right 
is considered a unit of legal objectivity. Identification of a collective 
right, we observed above, rests in the justification of the collective right 
with reference to a basic text. The identity of a collective right rests in a 
source.The juristic role is to rationally trace any alleged collective right 
to its source. As HLA Hart states, "what is crucial is the 
acknowledgment of reference to the writing or inscription as 
authoritative i.e. as the proper was of disposing of doubts as to the 
existence of the rule [sic concept]."1 
The language of a culture is unwritten. An unwritten language is 
constituted from assumptions and expectations. To be sure, an 
unwritten language may be evidenced by treaties, statutes and other 
written sources. But such sources are indicia of unwritten legal 
obligations. Aside from written sources as indicia, bodily gestures may 
constitute an unwritten language. The gestures are not of a biological 
body but of an experiential body.2 The written language of collective 
rights, along with statutes, precedents, treaties and customary 
international norms, signifies the rights as concepts prior to 
experience. 
As such, the written language cannot exist as a source of meaning 
without the unwritten language of the culture in which the written 
language is immersed. The unwritten language analytically (as well as 
experientially) precedes the collective rights as concepts. I say 
'analytically' because the written language cannot identify collective 
rights without the 'pre-legal' social-cultural assumptions and 
expectations. I say 'experientially' because jurists experience judicial 
habits and rituals before they analyse collective rights signified by a 
basic text. And so, the basic texts are not 'givens' or starting-points of 
legal  analysis  as often assumed by jurists.  The texts  are   obligatory 
 
 
' Hart, Concept of Law supra note 36, 95. 
2 This is examined in Conklin, The Phenomenology of the Modem Legal Discourse (Aldershot: 
















because of the pre-intellectual assumptions and expectations. The 
priority of collective rights over culture has heretofore foreclosed such 
assumptions and expectations from legal analysis. We are left, then, 
with the problematic that the analytic methodology excludes from legal 
analysis the very conditions generating the content of the collective 
rights. Only concepts signified by signs of a state-centric authorial 
institution are assumed to be knowable by lawyers. 
The Conditions Constituting an Unwritten Legal Language 
Let us delve deeper into the nature of the unwritten language of a 
culture. The most important factor generating a culture is the collective 
memory of the group.A collective memory is not something personally 
experienced in a concrete event. A personal memory can be recovered 
through self-reflection, therapy or 'flash-backs' because the memory 
had been personally experienced. The individual may reflect about the 
personal experience or even write about the experience. A collective 
memory, however, incorporates the memories of the group 
independent of one's personal experiences.1 A collective memory is 
shared amongst members of a group before one becomes a member 
of the group. The collective memory lacks a distinct origin in time as 
one personally experiences an event. A collective memory is not 
written down although writing may offer evidence of the collective 
memory. Collective memories, preceding birth, are subtly transferred 
through bodily rituals, formal and informal education, social 
relationships, religious practices, and day-to-day experiences. Pierre 
Nora describes a collective memory as constituted from "gestures and 
habits, unspoken craft traditions, intimate physical  knowledge, 
ingrained reminiscences, and spontaneous reflexes."2 A collective 
memory is involuntary and unintentional in the sense of being the 
object of self-conscious action. That is, a culture's assumptions and 
expectations embody the relation of texts to their signified concepts 
which we  have taken  as  collective  rights.  Even a  personal memory 
 
 
1 Karl Jung, 'The Concept of the Collective Unconscious' in Walter K Gordon (ed), Literature in 
Critical Perspective (New York, Appleton-Crofts, 1968) 504-0B. 
2 
Pierre Nora (ed), Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, Eng translations edn, ed & 
forew by Lawrence D Kritzman, trans Arthur Goldhammer, 3 vols (New York: Columbia 
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from a personal experience is embodied with one's collective 
memories.1 A collective memory constitutes a pre-intellectual or 
experiential knowledge. 
Accordingly, the context-specific social experiences constituting 
a culture, not texts, bond individuals together. This may be so of 
members of a state as much as of a social group. Indeed, early 19th 
century European jurists such as Hegel believed that such a social 
bonding would culminate in the nation-state. Hegel himself, however, 
recognised that intermediate organisations between individual and 
state also possessed a social bonding. Such organisations were 
exemplified by the family, corporations ( Korporationen), an economic 
class (or 'estate'), and charitable institutions.2 Today, one might add 
such intermediate social organisations as trade unions, religious 
groups, and other groups generally described as having an ethnic 
character although one might be unclear as to what it means to be a 
member of an ethnic group. 
The critical point is the sense of one's belonging to such a 
group. The member shares unquestioned assumptions and 
expectations shared in the group. In this context Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] considers 
a culture as synonymous with religion or language. General Comment 
23 of the UN Human Rights Committee expresses that the kef to a 
recognised collective right is just such a sense of belonging. This 
'belonging' is said to address one's 'enjoyment of a particular culture' 
or 'a way of life'.4 Such a social belonging draws from one's collective 
memories and personally experienced memories. 
Let us identify the several features of a collective memory, 




1  See esp M. Sturken, "Narratives of Recovery: Repressed Memory as Cultural Memory" in Mieke Bal, 
Jonathan Crewe & Leo Spitzer (eds), Acts of memory: cultural recall in the present 
(Hanover & London:University press of New England, 1999), 231-48. 
2 See generally Conklin, Hegel's Laws: the legitimacy of a modem legal order (Slanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2008), 215-19. 
3 HRC General Comment 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities) In UN International Human Rights 
Instruments supra note 17. 













For one thing, one generating condition of a culture is a "habit 
memory". Rituals and ceremonies constitute habits. Such rituals and 
ceremonies are bodily experienced. We do not stop and think as to 
which habits are material to our actions. We do not deliberate about 
them except as re-presented as signs representing concepts about the 
habits. We do not think nor deliberate about the habits. Indeed, if we 
insisted upon debating whether the habit should be replaced by a 
different habit, we might meet with ostracism. 
There is a second feature characterizing the role of a collective 
memory in a culture. The collective memory may retain the signs and 
symbols of the group's past - the ritual of standing at attention upon 
hearing one's national anthem or buying a 'poppy' on veteran's day (at 
least in North American states), the annual march by veterans on 
Remembrance Day (at least for the winning side) or consternation 
upon observing the national flag at half-mast. Any such gestural 
expression is a symbol with which one is immediately bonded without 
thinking  about  the  habit.  Paul  Ricoeur  used  the  term  'symbol'  to 
connote such a felt immediacy in contrast with a sign which represents 
a concept.
1 
One identifies immediately with a symbol without the 
mediation of concepts. 
Any such symbol, though, may fade or become stronger 
through time.2 A collective memory may suddenly become culturally 
important. The collective memory subtly fluctuates. With such a flux of 
collective memory, the composition of the in- and out-group may vary 
through time. Individuals subtly and slowly assimilate into the group. 
Even  a  university  group,  better  institutionalised  as  a  faculty  or a 
department, may radically change because of a reappraisal of the 
members of the in-group. Although the analysis  of the relation of sign 
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misses what Ishall describe as 'meaning'.1 The shared memories of a 
group may displace one culture with another group's culture. A civil  
war is only one situs of cultural  struggle. 
A third way that collective memory generates culture concerns 
the experiential space associated with the collective memory. Maurice 
Halbwachs (1877-1945) highlights how social groups "enclose and 
retrieve remembrances" within a spatial structure.2 A group's 
experienced identity with a physical site - say, a marbled wall in 
Washington with the names of veterans from a war, a flag imprinted in 
the lawn of a park, a flag at half mast, a museum - may be crucial to 
constitute a collective memory. One bonds immediately with the 
symbol without a second thought about whether to do so. Territorial 
knowledge represents just such a sense of immediacy in legal culture. 
Whether a right, property, jurisdiction or a reserved domain of the 
state, we take for granted that the unit of law manifests a territorial-like 
space inside a boundary.3 Its manifestation in territorial control 
transcends an experiential sense of space. A family or ethnic group 
experiences a space which may not necessarily connote territoriality. 
Experiential knowledge of space works to bond individuals into a social 
group. A physical situs may take on different collective memories for 
different groups. The experiential knowledge about space may shift   in 
time and vary in depth from group to group. As Nora states, "memory 
is blind to all but the group it binds."4 A self-consciousness of such 
symbols of a collectivity buried deep in the consciousness embody a 
culture. The abstraction and reduction conquers and annexes the lived 
acts of meaning generating the collective memory. The latter   lived 





1 See Husserl, Ideas sect. 96, p.257. 
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A final way that a collective memory helps generate a culture is 
a group's forgetting of past experienced events.1 Pierre Nora's re- 
reading of the French past has highlighted how the past has been 
interpreted by 'Frenchmen' with presupposed interpretative archetypes 
or structures of thought. Such archetypes contrast with concrete 
events experienced by individuals and groups in the past.2 Along a 
similar line, judgements of the Canadian Supreme Court have 
idealised the Canadian past by forgetting our dark moments - the 
colonizing of traditional (sc. tribal) communities, governmental efforts 
to assimilate indigenous inhabitants into the social life of the 
UK/Canadian states, the poll tax imposed upon Asian immigrants, the 
forcible removal of children from indigenous homes in order to 
assimilate them into the state-centric legal culture, the internment for 
several years of Canadian citizens of Uthe Japanese race", the 
imposition of parliamentary closure after two days of debate regarding 
the constitutionalising of a charter of rights and freedoms, the 
imposition of emergency legislation for much of the 20th century,  and 
on it goes.
3 
The forgetting may paradoxically transpire by the public 
forgiveness  of a past dark  event  in  the  social group's past.  This 
forgetting suggests that a collective memory is greater than the sum of 
particular experienced events of the group. Acts of forgetting reinforce 
a group's cultural identity. Perhaps we had best describe the collective 
memory as an image, rather than an actuality, of the past. 
Now, instead of gazing outward and backward from the jurist 
towards texts, the juristic study of a culture turns one inward towards 
the shared assumptions and expectations of personal and collective 
memories. The methodology of becoming conscious of legal culture is 





Paul Rlcoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (trans by Kathleen Blarney & David Pellauer; 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 412-56. 
2 
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expectations impact upon how one observes an event experienced by 
another.1 
Against the  background  of collective memories, we  can   now 
appreciate one cultural element of the generation of a collective right. 
The social bonding, inculcated though collective memories, confers 
body into the content of a culture. That embodiment of a culture is 
buried inside the citation or argument about a collective right. In 
contrast with a right which, after all, is a mere concept or form, cultural 
phenomena embody the content of the concept/right. Such a 
concept/right is otherwise content-independent. Although the unwritten 
assumptions and expectations generating a social bond may defer to a 
structure, the structure is meant rather than posited from concepts. 
The meant structure is constituted from acculturated meanings rather 
than re=presented from concepts emptied of social-cultural 
phenomena. The legal bond is unwritten and experientially prior to the 
written language of state organizations such as legislatures and courts. 
Such  pre-legal  phenomena,  as  Werner  Marx  indicates,  may  be 
recreated imaginatively in contrast with the analysis or intellectual 
decomposition of collective rights as concepts.2 The legal bond is pre- 
intellectual. Antigone's unwritten laws embodied how she experienced 
Creon's laws. Although  Hegel argued that  members of  indigenous 
traditional communities of Africa in his day could develop into self- 
conscious individuals, the indigenous peoples of North America could 
not do so.3  The jurist of the modem legal order, he claimed, had  to 
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completely break from the ethoi of tribal societies before a modem 
ethos of self-consciousness could develop.1 
The social bonding in a culture draws from family, religious 
associations, the experienced place of one's children's schooling, 
experiences at work and the like. Such shared experiences are not 
identifiable in the intellectualisation about concepts. Collective rights 
are not observable as empirical events by some outside psychologist or 
jurist. They cannot be retrieved by a therapeutic assessment of an 
individual. Indeed, they may never have been actually experienced by 
natural persons. The social belonging of a culture may hinge upon a 
myth or the fictitious military outcome of a battle centuries-ago or upon 
a symbol such as a flag or national anthem. The traditional analysis of 
collective rights does not recover such shared experiences as 
elements of law. Rather, the traditional analysis applies such rights to 
experiential knowledge. 
Accordingly, the experiential knowledge constituting a culture 
analytically exists prior to the acts of intellectualization in a written 
language of collective rights. The collective rights are only concepts. 
The language about such concepts, representing rights as they do, 
generalise about legal persons. Such general categories are indifferent 
to context-specific phenomena from which a culture emerges. If we 
remain confined in our analysis to collective rights as concepts, 
collective rights are analysed after the pre-intellectual sense of 
belonging constituting the unwritten language of a culture. Such 
unwritten time and space cannot be quantified. The social bonding 
manifested by cultural phenomena constitutes the obligatory character 
of an identifiable law. When Aristotle elaborated the nature of the 
constitutions of Sparta, Crete, Carthage and Athens, he addressed 
indicia of such an unwritten ethos: social practices, political practices, 
the distribution of wealth, economic obstacles to the access to office, 
qualifications for judicial and deliberative office, the de facto relation of 
one institution to another, and the consequences of legislation. Despite 
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constitutive of 'reality', his last work, The Laws, highlights  the  
importance of the pre-intellectual assumptions and traditions. The 
unwritten language of a culture provided "the connecting  lengths 
between  all the enactments  already  reduced to writing",  Plato writes 
(Laws 7.793b, 8.832.e). Cicero similarly makes a big thing of such a 
legal bond.1 And that social bonding constituted the obligatory 
character of the identity of a law. Cicero insisted that a "law was not 
thought up by human minds ... it is not some piece of legislation by 
popular assemblies ... ." (Leg. 2.8). And again, through the voice of 
Marcus in De Legibus, "the legislation that has been written down for 
nations in different ways and for particular occasions has the name of 
law more as a matter of courtesy than as fact"  ( Leg  2.11).  Hegel 
follows up with his emphasis that discrete written laws are  nested 
inside a Sttlichkeit. The role of the jurist, he argues, is to become self- 
conscious of the unwritten ethos. Even the Supreme Court of Canada 
has required trial judges to address pre-contact indigenous  cultures 
with oral evidence.2 Collective memories have also been material for 
the recognition of an effective nationality.3 An effective nationality, as 
opposed   to   a  formal   de  jure   nationality,   draws   from   the social 
relationships.4 
The International Court in Nottebohm outlined this redirection of 
the nature of a legal bond from a relation of a natural person to the 
state to the social relationships of natural persons.
5 
Social 
relationships are manifested inside intermediate groups between the 
individual and the state. The groups, again, may be familiar, religious, 
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social bonding draw from one's family ties, participation in public life, 
attachment to his children and, more generally, in an "attachment, a 
genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together 
with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.n1 The International 
Law Commission [ILC] has described such social relations as 
embodying a "personaln "emotional attachment to a particular 
countryn.2 The ILC  has added such social factors as the individual's 
place of residence, the unity of family, military obligations, and the 
entitlement to pensions (1997).3 The ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection has added a further series of indicia of a social bond: 
[t]he authorities indicate that such factors include habitual residence, 
the amount of time spent in each country of nationality, date of 
naturalization (i.e. the length of the period spent as a national of the 
protecting State before the claim arose); place, curricula and language 
of education; employment and financial interests; place of family life; 
family ties in each country; participation in social and public life;use of 
language; taxation, bank account, social security insurance; visits to 
the other State of nationality; possession and use of passport of the 
other State; and military service.4 
 
The decisions of contemporary refugee and human rights tribunals 
have added that social bonding draws from one's relations with her/his 
synagogue, mosque, church or other place of worship as well as 
expectations gained during years of employment, place of habitation 
and other factors. The ILC has explained that a legal bond involves a 
"personal" "attachment" and "genuine linkn involve an individual's 
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indicated, the relation of a natural person to a territory constitutes "a 
social reality in the link between people and territory."
1 
The legal bond 
represents pre-intellectual assumptions and expectations constituting 
one's culture, not the a priori concepts such as collective rights. The 
identity of collective rights depends upon such a legal bond as a social 
relationship. Accordingly, the identity of a collective right is nested in 
cultural phenomena analytically and experientially prior to any text that 
represents a collective right. 
Conclusion 
A culture analytically and experientially pre-exists the analysis of 
collective rights. Collective memories are attributes of cultural 
phenomena. Cultural phenomena, not collective rights as concepts, 
determine the boundary of knowledge about collective rights. So too, 
cultural phenomena factor into the constitution of the identity of the 
group entitled to collective rights. The same concerns the identity of 
excluded groups. Each group has its own collective memories. Unless 
the jurist becomes self-conscious of a culture, including her/his own 
legal culture, the jurist is fooled into believing that her/his legal opinion 
rests upon a conceptual objectivity of rules, principles, rights, doctrines 
and other concepts. The jurist proceeds as if a priori collective rights 
can change a culture without addressing the cultural conditions 
generating the collective rights. 
The content of collective rights is not intellectually constructed 
from the analysis of concepts. Nor is the content of collective rights 
constructed by justifying a right in terms of a basic text. The group 
entitled to collective rights becomes a generalised empty category so 
long as collective rights are analysed without an examination of the 
cultural phenomena generating the social group so entitled. What is 
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experiential knowledge, a knowledge embodying a culture.1 Indeed, a 
crucial feature of the embodiment of identifiable collective rights rests 
in the collective memories shared by members of a group before the 
members are assimilated into the social group. Such memories 
inculcate unwritten assumptions and expectations which provide the 
background conditions generating our knowledge about collective 
rights. Although we tend to accept that the boundary between 
collective rights and the prior cultural phenomena is itself intellectually 
constructed by the post facto representations in a written language, 
there cannot be a knowledge about collective rights without pre- 
intellectual experiential knowledge. Such pre-intellectual knowledge 
constitutes the legal bond of any group, including the alleged nation of 
a state. The pre-intellectual knowledge is not drawn from a priori 
concepts but from the social experiences constitutive of social 
bonding. 
The problem is that the collective memories of 'the social 
group' have been pictured by jurists from the standpoint of the present, 
not from the standpoint of a past isolated and distant from the jurist. 
And so, past experiential knowledge remains concealed inside the 
present of which the texts about collective rights are best 
representative. If we strive to unconceal the collective memories of any 
affirmed social group, our own present standpoint - one that takes a 
pyramidal governmental structure, private property, individualism, 
rights, and the like for granted - reinforces a cultural violence. We 
jurists may believe that the founding fathers of our state's written 
constitution actually intended the scope of a collective right to be such 
and such. And yet, we may failto appreciate that what is really at issue 
is the cultural generation of such a belief in the state's written 
language. In order to understand why collective rights are legally 
obligatory we need to pry behind the cultural conditions constituting 
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of the written language forecloses jurists from trying to understand the 
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